Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 405.

[385] Ante, p. 106.

[386] To John Taylor, Sept. 10, 1810. Works of James Monroe, vol. vi.
p. 128.

[387] Monroe to Jefferson, Monroe's Works, vol. v. p. 268.

[388] Annals of Congress, 1811-12, p. 2046.

[Illustration: THEATRE OF LAND AND COAST WARFARE]

CHAPTER V

THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

War being now immediately at hand, it is advisable, for the better
appreciation of the course of events, the more accurate estimate of
their historical and military value, to consider the relative
conditions of the two opponents, the probable seats of warlike
operations, and the methods which it was open to either to pursue.

Invasion of the British Islands, or of any transmarine possession of
Great Britain--save Canada--was denied to the United States by the
immeasurable inferiority of her navy. To cross the sea in force was
impossible, even for short distances. For this reason, land operations
were limited to the North American Continent. This fact, conjoined
with the strong traditional desire, received from the old French wars
and cherished in the War of Independence, to incorporate the Canadian
colonies with the Union, determined an aggressive policy by the United
States on the northern frontier. This was indeed the only
distinctively offensive operation available to her upon the land;
consequently it was imposed by reasons of both political and military
expediency. On the other hand, the sea was open to American armed
ships, though under certain very obvious restrictions; that is to say,
subject to the primary difficulty of evading blockades of the coast,
and of escaping subsequent capture by the very great number of
British cruisers, which watched all seas where British commerce went
and came, and most of the ports whence hostile ships might issue to
prey upon it. The principal trammel which now rests upon the movements
of vessels destined to cripple an enemy's commerce--the necessity to
renew the motive power, coal, at frequent brief intervals--did not
then exist. The wind, upon which motion depended, might at particular
moments favor one of two antagonists relatively to the other; but in
the long run it was substantially the same for all. In this respect
all were on an equal footing; and the supply, if fickle at times, was
practically inexhaustible. Barring accidents, vessels were able to
keep the sea as long as their provisions and water lasted. This per