al war, was signed
April 30, 1748, by England, France, and Holland, and finally by all
the powers in October of the same year. With the exception of certain
portions shorn off the Austrian Empire,--Silesia for Prussia, Parma
for the Infante Philip of Spain, and some Italian territory to the
east of Piedmont for the King of Sardinia,--the general tenor of the
terms was a return to the status before the war. "Never, perhaps, did
any war, after so many great events, and so large a loss of blood and
treasure, end in replacing the nations engaged in it so nearly in the
same situation as they held at first." In truth, as regarded France,
England, and Spain, the affair of the Austrian succession, supervening
so soon upon the outbreak of war between the two latter, had wholly
turned hostilities aside from their true direction and postponed for
fifteen years the settlement of disputes which concerned them much
more nearly than the accession of Maria Theresa. In the distress of
her old enemy, the House of Austria, France was easily led to renew
her attacks upon it, and England as easily drawn to oppose the
attempts of the French to influence or dictate in German affairs,--a
course the more readily followed from the German interests of the
king. It may be questioned whether the true policy for France was to
direct the war upon the heart of the Austrian Empire, by way of the
Rhine and Germany, or, as she finally did, upon the remote possessions
of the Netherlands. In the former case she rested on friendly
territory in Bavaria, and gave a hand to Prussia, whose military
power was now first felt. Such was the first theatre of the war. On
the other hand, in the Netherlands, whither the chief scene of
hostilities shifted later, France struck not only at Austria, but also
at the sea powers, always jealous of her intrusion there. They were
the soul of the war against her, by their subsidies to her other
enemies and by the losses inflicted on her commerce and that of Spain.
The misery of France was alleged to the King of Spain by Louis XV., as
forcing him to conclude peace; and it is evident that the suffering
must have been great to induce him to yield such easy terms as he did,
when he already held the Netherlands and parts of Holland itself by
force of arms. But while so successful on the continent, his navy was
annihilated and communication with the colonies thus cut off; and
though it may be doubted whether the French government of th
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