from
thirty to forty degrees (Plate VIIa. A, A). The attack which Byng by
his own account meant to make, each ship against its opposite in the
enemy's line, difficult to carry out under any circumstances, was here
further impeded by the distance between the two rears being much
greater than that between the vans; so that his whole line could not
come into action at the same moment. When the signal was made, the van
ships kept away in obedience to it, and ran down for the French so
nearly head-on (B, B) as to sacrifice their artillery fire in great
measure; they received three raking broadsides, and were seriously
dismantled aloft. The sixth English ship, counting from the van, had
her foretopmast shot away, flew up into the wind, and came aback,
stopping and doubling up the rear of the line. Then undoubtedly was
the time for Byng, having committed himself to the fight, to have set
the example and borne down, just as Farragut did at Mobile when his
line was confused by the stopping of the next ahead; but according to
the testimony of the flag-captain, Matthews's sentence deterred him.
"You see, Captain Gardiner, that the signal for the line is out, and
that I am ahead of the ships 'Louisa' and 'Trident' [which in the
order should have been ahead of him]. You would not have me, as the
admiral of the fleet, run down as if I were going to engage a single
ship. It was Mr. Matthews's misfortune to be prejudiced by not
carrying down his force together, which I shall endeavor to avoid."
The affair thus became entirely indecisive; the English van was
separated from the rear and got the brunt of the fight (C). One French
authority blames Galissoniere for not tacking to windward of the
enemy's van and crushing it. Another says he ordered the movement, but
that it could not be made from the damage to the rigging; but this
seems improbable, as the only injury the French squadron underwent
aloft was the loss of one topsail yard, whereas the English suffered
very badly. The true reason is probably that given and approved by one
of the French authorities on naval warfare. Galissoniere considered
the support of the land attack on Mahon paramount to any destruction
of the English fleet, if he thereby exposed his own. "The French navy
has always preferred the glory of assuring or preserving a conquest to
that more brilliant perhaps, but actually less real, of taking some
ships, and therein has approached more nearly the true end that has