the East Indies, appear only as the pursued in a general chase.

The action imposed upon the French fleets was, however, consistent
with the general policy of the French government; and John Clerk was
probably right in saying that there is apparent in this action off
Minorca a tactics too well defined to be merely accidental,--a tactics
essentially defensive in its scope and aim.[96] In assuming the
lee-gage the French admiral not only covered Mahon, but took a good
defensive position, imposing upon his enemy the necessity of attacking
with all the consequent risks. Clerk seems to bring evidence enough to
prove that the leading French ships did, after roughly handling their
assailants, astutely withdraw (C) thus forcing the latter to attack
again with like results. The same policy was repeatedly followed
during the American war twenty years later, and with pretty uniform
success; so much so that, although formal avowal of the policy is
wanting, it may be concluded that circumspection, economy, defensive
war, remained the fixed purpose of the French authorities, based
doubtless upon the reasons given by Admiral Grivel, of that navy:--

"If two maritime powers are at strife, the one that has the
fewest ships must always avoid doubtful engagements; it must run
only those risks necessary for carrying out its missions, avoid
action by manoeuvring, or at worst, if forced to engage, assure
itself of favorable conditions. The attitude to be taken should
depend radically upon the power of your opponent. Let us not
tire of repeating, according as she has to do with an inferior
or superior power, France has before her two distinct
strategies, radically opposite both in means and ends,--Grand
War and Cruising War."

Such a formal utterance by an officer of rank must be received with
respect, and the more so when it expresses a consistent policy
followed by a great and warlike nation; yet it may be questioned
whether a sea power worthy of the name can thus be secured. Logically,
it follows from the position assumed, that combats between equal
forces are to be discouraged, because the loss to you is greater than
the loss to your opponent. "In fact," says Ramatuelle, upholding the
French policy, "of what consequence to the English would be the loss
of a few ships?" But the next inevitable step in the argument is that
it is better not to meet the enemy. As another Frenchman,[97]
previously quo