not so near to
Him.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the quantity of love on the
part of the good which we wish our friends.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 7]
Whether We Ought to Love Those Who Are Better More Than Those Who Are
More Closely United Us?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love those who are better
more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is
in no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for
some reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black
mixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for
some reason, according to Luke 14:26: "If any man come to Me, and
hate not his father," etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful
for any reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who
are better more than those who are more closely connected with us.
Obj. 2: Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God
loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought
to love the better man more than one who is more closely united to
him.
Obj. 3: Further, in every friendship, that ought to be loved most
which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by
natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by
nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship
of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has
more to do with better men than with those who are more closely
united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men
more than those who are more closely connected with us.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now the inward affection of
charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity
regards those who are nearer to us before those who are better.
_I answer that,_ Every act should be proportionate both to its object
and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while,
from the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus
movement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the
intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved
and the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from
its object, but its intensity is due to the lover.
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