ther virtue
except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in
reference to joy (Q. 28, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of
charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is
placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 69, AA. 1, 3). It is also numbered among the
fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of
its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in
respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect
of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.
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QUESTION 30

OF MERCY* [*The one Latin word "misericordia" signifies either pity
or mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may stand
either for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for
the virtue.]
(In Four Articles)

We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person
pitied?

(2) To whom does it belong to pity?

(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 1]

Whether Evil Is Properly the Motive of Mercy?

Objection 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the
motive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q. 19, A. 1; I-II, Q. 79, A. 1,
ad 4; I, Q. 48, A. 6), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now
fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not
excite mercy.

Obj. 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call for
pity but drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive
of mercy.

Obj. 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of
evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8).
Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is
a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is
the motive of mercy.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is
heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him
if we can. For