with reason, and in
accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of
the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei ix, 5) that "this movement of the mind" (viz. mercy) "obeys the
reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is
safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant."
And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the
soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 59,
AA. 4, 5), it follows that mercy is a virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying
to the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it
impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis,
considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one
another on the part of their respective estimation of another's
evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to
suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it
esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well
with the undeserving: "both of these are praiseworthy and come from
the same disposition of character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking,
however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state
further on (Q. 36, A. 3).
Reply Obj. 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which
is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other
virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect,
namely the misery of the person pitied.
Reply Obj. 4: Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue
having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called
nemesis, because "they both proceed from the same character" (Rhet.
ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but
as passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet
nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in
which case they assume the character of a virtue.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 4]
Whether Mercy Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues.
For the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is
preferred before the worship of God, according to Osee 6:6 and Matt.
12:7: "I have desired mercy and not sacrifice." Therefore mercy is
the great
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