y suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
xxxiv) that "false godliness," i.e. of the proud, "is not
compassionate but disdainful."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 3]

Whether Mercy Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief
part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
Now choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled"
(Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called
a virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of
Sallust (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of
doubt, should be free from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the
mind does not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way."
Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But
nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore
mercy is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they
result from charity, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 4). Now
mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we
weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice.
Therefore mercy is not a special virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is
not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its object,
neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral
virtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to
justice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of
the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7).
Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "Cicero in
praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at
once more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when
he says: 'Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful
than thy mercy.'" Therefore mercy is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now
this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive
appetite, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas,
in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective
appetite, in as much as one person's evil is displeasing to another.
This movement may be ruled in accordance