"to
one's friends." Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to
others.

_I answer that,_ Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This
good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of
good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of
friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love
includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated
above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 2). Now the will carries into effect if
possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the result of
an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend. Therefore
beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friendship or
charity.

But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some
special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special
character and will belong to some special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "love
moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the
inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the
superior to watch over the inferior:" and in this respect beneficence
is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to
honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to
bestow good things on us.

Reply Obj. 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of
gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward
passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to
liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive
desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part
with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet
desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the
other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence
belongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract
from a man's friendship, if, through love, he give his friend
something he would like to keep for himself; rather does this prove
the perfection of his friendship.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the
benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see
therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of
distress or defect.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 2]

Whether We Ought to Do Good to All?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all.