e be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to
some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such
a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man
thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension,
belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks
that it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight
matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect
peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire
fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the
wayfarer.

Reply Obj. 3: Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so
far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of
charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes
peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 4]

Whether Peace Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a
matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are
precepts about keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you"
(Mk. 9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is
meritorious to keep peace, according to Matt. 5:9: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Therefore
peace is a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which
are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20).
Therefore peace is a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto.
But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xix, 11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4), when a number of acts
all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other,
they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue
from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For,
though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not
two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction:
and fire produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.

Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God
and of our neighbor, as shown above (A. 3), there is no o