ion.

As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in
the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality of love but
the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife
is her being united to him in the flesh.
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TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 12]

Whether a Man Ought to Love More His Benefactor Than One He Has
Benefited?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor
more than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud.
iv): "Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love
him first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses
to love, but declines to return love already given." Now a man's
benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore
we ought to love our benefactors above all.

Obj. 2: Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man
or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is a
more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against
him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly
actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those
to whom we are kind.

Obj. 3: Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and
then one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25].
Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should
be loved above all others.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that
"benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather
than vice versa."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 9, 11), a thing is loved more
in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent
good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we
ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle
of good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more
excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father (A. 9).

In the second way, however, we love those more who have received
benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by
four arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the
handiwork of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: "He
was made by so and so." Now it is natural to a man to love his own
work (thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems): and
the reason is that we love _to be_ and _