ed, is
finite.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first
three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the
last takes it in the second sense.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 6]

Whether in Loving God We Ought to Observe Any Mode?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in
loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and
order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love
of God is the best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above
all . . . things, have charity." Therefore there ought to be a
mode of the love of God.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee,
tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the
desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought." But it would
be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were
one. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.

Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the measure
which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode." Now the measure of
the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore
just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the
exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: "Your reasonable
service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.

_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the
cause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure."

_I answer that,_ As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above
(Obj. 3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which
determination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing
measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure
essentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and
modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is
found relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure.
Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the
thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure,
whether by deficiency or by excess.

Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end,
because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be
taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9).
Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their
mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, acc