other. And since the subsequent acts do not
proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act,
hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that
preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the
virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the passions
(I-II, Q. 25, AA. 2, 4) that love is the first affection of the
appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the
same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good,
and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these
acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but
from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct
from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it
is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).
Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate
self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of
the vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 77, A. 4); so that it was
necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices,
because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On
the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely
charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated
above (here and A. 2).
Reply Obj. 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but
hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.
_difficult,_ and _possible to obtain;_ for which reason it is
accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love
any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of
charity, albeit not its first act.
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QUESTION 29
OF PEACE (Four Articles)
We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?
(2) Whether all things desire peace?
(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?
(4) Whether peace is a virtue?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 1]
Whether Peace Is the Same As Concord?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well
ordered concord." Now we are speaking here of no other peace than
that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.
Obj. 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace
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