is meant
by the words of Luke 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken
together, and running over shall they give into your bosom." Yet,
since no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it
follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on
the contrary, man enters into it, according to Matt. 25:21: "Enter
into the joy of thy Lord."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to
the thing in which we rejoice.

Reply Obj. 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach the
term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further
will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term,
some will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy
will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully
set at rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account
of a fuller participation of the Divine happiness.

Reply Obj. 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect
of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There
is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as
we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That you
may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and
spiritual understanding."
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 4]

Whether Joy Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary
to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth
and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which
is _good,_ so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be
virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4:
"Rejoice in the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is not numbered among the theological virtues,
nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is
evident from what has been said above (I-II, QQ. 57, 60, 62).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 2, 4), virtue is
an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an
inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same
habit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of
which follows from an