with the beloved, which union is
not denoted by goodwill.
Reply Obj. 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to
friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he
says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in
respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this
belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 3]
Whether Out of Charity God Ought to Be Loved for Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for
Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a
homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to
love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the
intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the
objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of
something else.
Obj. 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through
something else, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."
Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for
Himself.
Obj. 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Matt. 1:1,
and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his commentary
on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract.
ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear
shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it seems
that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some
evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.
_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to
enjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be
enjoyed" as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved
for Himself.
_I answer that,_ The preposition "for" denotes a relation of
causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal,
efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to
be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According
to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for
another. In respect of the final cause, we love medicine, for
instance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man
for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good
and therefore lovable; in respect
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