agnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.

Reply Obj. 2: Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in
matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it
tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as
fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.

Reply Obj. 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something great,
as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the
reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason
by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand.
This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both
those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would
incur the risk of a great loss.
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QUESTION 135

OF MEANNESS*
(In Two Articles)
[*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as "magnificentia" is
doing great things.]

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which
head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether meanness is a vice?

(2) Of the vice opposed to it.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 135, Art. 1]

Whether Meanness Is a Vice?

Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice
moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore
both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But
magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue
rather than a vice.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful
reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy,
since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean man
is loth to spend money." But this belongs to covetousness or
illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the
others.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a
special vice opposed to magnificence.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6),
moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases
they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be
mean (_parvificus_) because he intends to do something little
(_parvum_). Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad
aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a
mean ma