the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but
on the contrary perfects it, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 2; Q. 117,
A. 1, Obj. 1). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the
"magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and this is opposed
to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore
magnificence is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act is
right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence is about
things to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence = _magna
facere_--i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather
than a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Human virtue is a participation of Divine power.
But magnificence (_virtutis_) belongs to Divine power, according to
Ps. 47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds."
Therefore magnificence is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ According to _De Coelo_ i, 16, "we speak of virtue
in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards
the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very
nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something
great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the
very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his
actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent
deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence,
either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as
explained above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), as also (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1)
when we were treating of the connection of virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if
we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean,
if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of
nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But
that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that
which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at
large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to
be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good,
but because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything
regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnifice