eeding
from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it
is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because
ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from
laziness in considering one's own ability, according to _Ethic._ iv,
3, or in accomplishing what is within one's power.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of
view of its effect.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor
is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of
death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that
pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we
consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is
roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which
disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however,
we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby
the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to
pusillanimity.
Reply Obj. 4: According to its proper species pusillanimity is a
graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good
things, which is a very great evil according to _Ethic._ iv.
Presumption, however, is stated to be "wicked" on account of pride
whence it proceeds.
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QUESTION 134
OF MAGNIFICENCE
(In Four Articles)
We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With
regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) What is its matter?
(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 1]
Whether Magnificence Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever
has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A.
1). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence:
because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every liberal
man is magnificent." Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to
_Ethic._ ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean,
for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are
opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is "equal," as
stated in _Metaph._ x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but
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