y briefly that Brown carries out in his own fashion the
conception of psychology which makes it an inductive science parallel
to the physical sciences, and to be pursued by the same methods. We
have to do with 'feelings' instead of atoms, and with mental instead
of 'material' chemistry. Our sole method is still an analysis such as
guides us in unravelling complex physical phenomena. We have, indeed,
to admit certain first truths--the belief in our own identity is one
of them--which are necessary to our very existence, although the
assertion of such principles was carried to an extravagant and
ridiculous length 'by Reid and some of his friends.' When, however, we
come to ask what these principles are, it must be admitted that they
are very innocent. They are not dangerous things, like 'innate ideas,'
capable of leading us to a transcendental world, but simply assertions
that we are warranted in trusting our sensations and applying a
thoroughly inductive and empirical method. They are the cement which
joins the feelings, and which, as Mill thought, could be supplanted by
'indissoluble associations.' The indefinite power thus attributed to
association became, as we shall see, Mill's most characteristic
doctrine. Meanwhile, I will only mention one inference which
illustrates Brown's philosophical tendencies. Stewart had spoken
doubtfully of the ontological argument for theology. Brown throws it
over altogether. He does not even change it into an 'intuition.' He
has always, he says, regarded it as 'absolutely void of force' unless
it tacitly assumes the 'physical argument.' Nay, it is one proof of
the force of this physical argument that it has saved us from doubts
which would be rather strengthened than weakened by the 'metaphysical
arguments.'[502] The 'physical argument' means the argument from
design, which thus becomes the sole support of theology.

Hamilton naturally regards Brown as a mere sceptic in disguise. His
theory of perception destroys his theory of personal identity. He has
refused to accept our intuitive belief in one case, and cannot appeal
to it in the other. He leaves no room for 'liberty of will,' and
advances 'no argument in support of this condition of our moral
being.'[503] Indeed, as Stewart complained, Brown, by identifying
'will' and 'desire,' has got rid of the will altogether. It is only
natural that a man who is making a scientific study of the laws of
human nature should find no room for an ass