that
observed facts should be the ultimate basis of the whole theory; and
to alter the primary data by virtue of deductions drawn from them
could obviously not be logically justifiable.
Such reflections, though sufficiently obvious, might be too far from
practical application to have much immediate effect. But the question
of the moral bearing of theology was of more interest; and, here, the
coincidence of the Utilitarianism with the accepted theology of the
day is especially important. The Deity regarded as the artificer
appears to be far from purely benevolent. In respect to morality, is
he not simply indifferent? Does he not make men fragile and place them
amidst pitfalls? Does he not constantly slay the virtuous and save the
wicked? How, indeed, from the purely empirical or scientific base, do
you deduce any moral attributes whatever? 'Natural theology,' as it
was called, might reveal a contriver, but could it reveal a judge or a
moral guide? Here the difficulty of a purely matter-of-fact theology
made itself felt on many sides. The remarkable influence of Butler
upon many minds was partly due to a perception of this omission.
Butler avowedly appeals to the conscience, and therefore at least
recognises God as directly revealed in a moral character. That seemed
to supply a gap in the ordinary theology. But in the purely empirical
view Butler's argument was untenable. It appealed to one of the
'intuitions' which were incompatible with its fundamental assumptions.
The compunctions of conscience were facts to be explained by
'association,' not to be regarded as intimations of wrath. Butler's
view might be inverted. The 'conscience' does, in truth, suggest the
divine wrath; but that only means that it suggests the quack remedies
upon which 'wonder-working' priests establish their power. Instead of
proving the truth of the religion, it explains the origin of
superstition. To James Mill, as we have seen, Butler's argument would
logically prove not a righteous governor but a cruel creator.
Theologians, again, of the Paley school, were bound in consistency to
the empirical or Utilitarian view of morality. Paley accepted the
consequences unreservedly; and if such philosophers as Brown and
Mackintosh persisted in regarding the coincidence between morality and
happiness as indicative of a pre-established harmony, not of an
identification of morality with the pursuit of general happiness, they
still admitted that 'utility' was
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