cteristic of the whole method. Mill, like Bentham, puts morality
upon the same plane with law. Conduct is influenced either by the
'community in its conjunct capacity'--that is, by law; or by
'individuals in their individual capacity'--that is, by morality.[595]
The sanction of one, we may infer, is force; of the other, approval
and disapproval. With this we must take another Benthamite doctrine,
of which I have already spoken.[596] 'Mr. Bentham demonstrated,' says
Mill, 'that the morality of an act does not depend upon the motive,'
and, further, that it 'is altogether dependent on the intention.'[597]
Upon this he constantly insists. Mackintosh's view that virtue depends
upon motive will be 'scorned by every man who has any knowledge of the
philosophy of the human mind.... The virtue does not depend upon the
motive. There is no bad motive. Every motive is the desire of good; to
the agent himself or to some one else.'[598] He gives an analysis of
action to put the point beyond doubt. Action supposes a 'motive,' a
'volition,' and an 'external act' or muscular contraction. So far
there is nothing moral. But then an act has consequences, good or bad,
to human beings, which constitute its utility. To make it moral, the
agent must anticipate 'beneficial consequences,' and must have no
reason to anticipate a balance of evil consequences. Intention means
the calculation of consequences, and without that calculation there
can be no morality.[599] Hence the morality is equivalent to a
'conviction of the general utility' of the action.[600] 'All this,' he
concludes, 'is settled by universal consent. It is vain, therefore, to
think of disputing it.' One may, however, ask what it means. I have
already observed that the view of the non-moral character of motive
was a natural corollary from the purely legal point of view. I must
now consider the results of applying it unreservedly in the
inappropriate sphere of ethics.

In the first place, the denial of any moral quality in motive seems to
be inconsistent with Mill's own principles. The Utilitarian, according
to him, holds that the moral law is essentially the statement that
certain conduct produces general happiness. If, then, we ask, Who is a
good man? we first reply that he is a man whose conduct produces
happiness. Another conclusion is obviously necessary, and is implied
in Mill's statement that the 'intention' is essential to morality. The
man, that is, must foresee that his co