the feeling a
mere removable addition. Apparently he would hold that the good
Samaritan and the Pharisee had the same feeling, though it prompted
one to relieve the sufferer and the other to relieve himself of the
sight of the sufferer. They had, of course, a feeling in common, but a
feeling which produced diametrically opposite effects, because
entering into totally different combinations.
If Mill's doctrine leads to an impossible strictness in one direction,
it leads to less edifying results in another. We have omitted 'motive'
and come to the critical question, How, after all, is the moral code
to be enforced? By overlooking this question and declaring 'motive' to
be irrelevant, we get the paradox already accepted by Bentham. His
definition of virtue is action for the good of others as well as of
ourselves. In what way is the existence of such action to be
reconciled with this doctrine? What are the motives which make men
count the happiness of others to be equally valuable with their own?
or, in the Utilitarian language, What is the 'sanction' of morality?
After all Bentham's insistence upon the 'self-preference principle'
and Mill's account of selfishness in his political theory, we are
suddenly told that morality means a lofty and rigid code in which the
happiness of all is the one end. Here again Mill is entangled by the
characteristic difficulty of his psychology. To analyse is to divide
objects into separate units. When he has to do with complex objects
and relations apparently reciprocal, he is forced to represent them by
a simple sequence. The two factors are not mutually dependent but
distinct things somehow connected in time. One result is his account
of 'ends' or 'motives' (the two, as he observes, are synonymous).[605]
The end is something to be gained by the act, the 'association' of
which with the act constitutes a 'desire.' This, we have seen, always
refers to the future.[606] In acting, then, I am always guided by
calculations of future pleasures or pains. I believe this to be one of
the most unfortunate because one of the most plausible of Utilitarian
fallacies. If we are determined by pains and pleasures, it is in one
sense as contradictory to speak of our being determined by future
pains and pleasures as to speak of our being nourished to-day by
to-morrow's dinner. The 'future pleasure' does not exist; the
anticipated pleasure acts by making the present action pleasant; and
we then move (as it i
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