s a trifle. These cases, he thinks,
would be 'uncommonly rare' under a well-conceived system. The extent
of evil in this life would therefore be trifling were superhuman
inducements entirely effaced from the human bosom, and if 'human
institutions were ameliorated according to the progress of
philosophy.'[618] On the other hand, the imaginary punishments are
singularly defective in the qualities upon which Bentham had insisted
in human legislation. They are remote and uncertain, and to make up
for this are represented as boundless in intensity and durability. For
that reason, they precisely reverse the admitted principle that
punishment should be so devised as to produce the greatest possible
effect by the smallest infliction of pain. Supernatural sanctions are
supposed to maximise pain with a minimum of effect. The fear of hell
rarely produces any effect till a man is dying, and then inflicts
great suffering, though it has been totally inefficient as a
preventive at the time of temptation. The influence of supernatural
penalties is therefore in 'an inverse ratio to the demand for
it.'[619] In reality, the efficacy of the sanctions is due to their
dependence upon public opinion. Our real motive for acting rightly is
our desire for the praise of our fellows and our interest in their
good conduct. We conceal this motive even from ourselves, because we
wish to have the credit of serving the Deity exclusively. This is
confirmed by the familiar instances of a conflict between public
opinion and religious sanctions. Duelling, fornication, and perjury
are forbidden by the divine law, but the prohibition is ineffectual
whenever the real sentiment of mankind is opposed to it. The divine
law is set aside as soon as it conflicts with the popular opinion. In
exceptional cases, indeed, the credit attached to unreasonable
practices leads to fanaticism, asceticism, and even insanity; but
superhuman terrors fail at once when they try to curb the action of
genuine substantial motives. Hence we must admit that they are useless
in the case even of 'secret crimes.' Religion, in short, prescribes
mischievous practices, becomes impotent except for the production of
misery, and is really, though not avowedly, dependent on the popular
sanction.[620]

We can now classify the evils actually produced. Religion injures
individuals by prescribing useless and painful practices: fasting,
celibacy, voluntary self-torture, and so forth. It suggests va