nduct will produce happiness.
The 'calculation' is precisely what makes an action moral as well as
accidentally useful. In other words, the man is good to whom the
knowledge that an act will produce happiness is the same thing as a
command to perform the act. The 'intention' could not affect conduct
without the corresponding motive, and Mill can at times recognise the
obvious consequence. The 'physical law' (meaning the law enforced by
physical coercion), he says incidentally, has 'extrinsic'
sanctions;[601] the moral law is different, because it sanctions good
actions for their goodness. 'Moral approval' must therefore include
approval of character. A man, to be moral, must be one who does useful
things simply because they are useful. He must then, it would seem, be
at least benevolent. The same thing is implied by the doctrine of
'intention' or 'calculation.' An action may be useful or the reverse
without being moral when the consequences are unknown to the agent. To
make it moral he must know the consequences--for otherwise he is
merely acting at random; and the foreseen consequences constitute the
'intention.' To this Mill adds that he must have taken into account
the consequences which 'might have been foreseen.'[602] Otherwise we
should have to excuse a man because he had neglected to calculate,
whereas to calculate is the very essence of virtue. A man who fired a
gun down a crowded street would not be excusable because he had not
thought of the result. He 'ought' to have thought of it. The question
of moral approval of any given action turns upon these questions. Did
a man foresee evil consequences and disregard them? He is then cruel.
Did he neglect to consider them? He is then culpably careless, though
not actually malignant. Were the consequences altogether beyond the
powers of reasonable calculation? Then he may be blameless. The whole
moral question, therefore, depends upon the character indicated; that
is, upon the motives which induce a man to calculate consequences and
which determine his conduct when the calculation is made.

The truth is, I think, and it is characteristic of Mill's modes of
analysis, that he is making an impossible abstraction. He is
separating parts of a single process and treating them as independent.
If actions are bad because they have bad consequences, motives are bad
because they are causes of bad actions. You cannot suppress the effect
without suppressing the cause, and therefore