ned to suppose will operate equally upon all men.
Such language could be justifiable only of an average and uniform
'man,' a kind of constant unit, whose varying behaviour must always be
explained by difference in circumstance. We have sufficiently seen the
results elsewhere, and in this ethical doctrine they are especially
manifest.

Mackintosh recognised the fact that morality is essentially a
function of character. Mill cannot fully admit that, because he
virtually assumes all character to be the same. Regarding morality as
something co-ordinate with law, he does not perceive that the very
possibility of law implies the moral instincts, which correspond to
the constitution of character, and belong to a sphere underlying, not
on the same plane with, the legislative sphere. They are the source of
all order; not themselves the product of the order. It is impossible
to deduce them, therefore, from the organisation which presupposes
them. Now, in one direction, Mill's theory leads, as his son remarked,
not to laxity but to excessive strictness. The 'criterion' is laid
down absolutely. The 'moral sense' is rejected because it means an
autocratic faculty, entitled to override the criterion by its own
authority. To appeal to 'motives' is to allow the individual to make
his own feeling the ultimate test of right and wrong. If we follow
Mill in this we are not really assuming the moral neutrality of motive
or the indifference, but an impossible profession of character. Men
are not governed by abstract principles but by their passions and
affections. The emotions, as Mackintosh rightly said, cannot be
resolved into the mere logic. Utility may give the true criterion of
morality, but it does not follow that the perception of utility is
implied in moral conduct. The motives are good which in fact produce
useful conduct, though the agent does not contemplate the abstract
principle. It is impossible that men should be moved simply by a
desire for the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number.' What does
and always must guide men is their personal relation to the little
circle which they actually influence. The good man is the man so
constituted that he will spontaneously fulfil his duties. The moral
law, that is, will be also the law of his character and conduct. The
mother is good because she loves her child, not because she sees that
care of her child is dictated by the general maxim of utility. The
'utility' of character means