, true
and false, apply not to facts but to propositions.[548] The judgment
is tested in some way by correspondence to the 'order of Nature,' or
of our sensations and ideas. What precisely is meant by this order? So
far as we have gone, it seems as if ideas might be combined in any
order whatever, and the most various beliefs generated in different
minds. Perhaps, however, the principle of association itself may
reveal something as to the possible modes of coalescence. Mill makes
contiguity an ultimate ground of association; and contiguity implies
that things have certain relations expressible in terms of space and
time and so forth. These primitive relations now come up for
consideration, and should enable us to say more precisely what kind of
order is possible. In fact, Mill now endeavours to analyse the
meanings of such words as relation in general, time, space, number,
likeness, personal identity and others. The effect of his analysis is
that the principles, whatever they may be, which might be supposed to
underlie association appear to be products of association. He begins
by asking what is the meaning of 'relative terms.' Their peculiarity
is that they 'always exist in pairs,' such as 'father and son,' 'high
and low,' 'right and left.' 'If it is asked, Why do we give names in
pairs? the general answer immediately suggests itself; it is because
the things named present themselves in pairs, that is, are joined by
association.'[549] J. S. Mill thinks that no part of the _Analysis_
is more valuable than the 'simple explanation' which follows. There is
no 'mystical bond called a relation' between two things, but 'a very
simple peculiarity in the concrete fact' marked by the names. In
'ordinary names of objects, the fact connoted by a name ... concerns
one object only'; in the case of relative names, 'the fact connoted
concerns two objects, and cannot be understood without thinking of
them both.' A 'fact concerning an object' is a curiously awkward
expression; but one point is clear. If the two objects concerned are
the same, whether considered apart or together, the 'relation' must be
something more than the facts, and therefore requires to be specified.
If they are, in fact, one thing, or parts of a continuous process, we
must ask how they come to be distinguished, and what ground there is
for speaking of association. James Mill, by considering the problem as
a mere question of 'names,' seems to intimate that the relat