he infers from the analogy that a feeling which arises out
of others can be resolved into them. 'Love and hate' and other
emotions are fundamentally different from the sensations by which they
are occasioned, not mere 'transformations' of those sensations. We, on
the other hand (that is to say, Reid and Stewart), have erred by
excessive amplification. Instead of identifying different things, we
have admitted a superfluous number of 'ultimate principles.'
The result is that besides the original sensations, we have to
consider a number of feelings, which, while essentially different, are
'suggested' or caused by them. These are parts of the whole
intellectual construction, and, though not transformed sensations, are
still 'feelings' arising in consequence of the sensations. They are
parts of the 'trains' or sequences of 'ideas.' It is accordingly
characteristic of Brown that he habitually describes an intellectual
process as a 'feeling.' The statement of a mathematical proportion,
for example, is a case of 'relative suggestion.' When we consider
two numbers together we have a '_feeling_ of the relation of
proportion.'[497] The 'profoundest reasonings' are 'nothing more than
a continued analysis of our thought,' by which we resolve the 'complex
_feelings_ of our minds' into the simpler conceptions out of which
they were constructed.[498] In other words, Brown, it would seem,
really accepts the _penser c'est sentir_, only that he regards the
_sentir_ as including separate classes of feeling, which cannot be
regarded as simple 'transformations' of sensation. They are 'states of
the mind' caused by, that is, invariably following upon, the simpler
states, and, of course, combining in an endless variety of different
forms. Reasoning is nothing more than a series of relative
'suggestions of which the separate subjects are felt by us to be
mutually related.'[499] Hence, too, arises his theory of
generalisation. He is, he says, not a 'nominalist' but a
'conceptualist,' and here, for once, agrees with Reid as against
Stewart.[500] The 'general term,' according to him, expresses the
'feeling or general notion of resemblance,' which arises upon a
contemplation of two objects. 'In Nature,' as he observes
elsewhere,[501] 'there are no classes,' but the observation of a
number of particular cases and a certain feeling to which we give a
name. Here, again, Brown's view coincides with that of his French
contemporaries.
We may then sa
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