elief in an external world as a case
of what Mill called 'indissoluble association.' Brown, as Mill
thought, was not sufficiently aware of the power of this principle,
and the difference between them is marked by this divergence. Brown
had a great deal to say about association, though he chose generally
to substitute the word 'suggestion,' previously familiar to Reid and
Berkeley.[490] He considers it, however, mainly in another relation.
He proposes to trace the order in which 'trains' of ideas succeed each
other in our minds. He does not dwell upon the influence of
association in producing belief. His question is not primarily as to
the logic, but as to the actual succession of our thoughts. He
explains that he uses the word 'suggestion' in order to avoid the
hypothesis that the sequence of two ideas necessarily implies a
previous state of mind in which they were brought together; and
endeavours to explain various cases (as, for example, association by
'contrast' as well as by 'likeness' or 'continuity') by a more
'subtile' analysis.[491] He then works out an elaborate theory of
'simple' and 'relative' suggestion. Simple 'suggestion'[492]
corresponds mainly to ordinary association, as when a friend's name or
his book calls up the thought of the man himself. 'Relative
suggestion' arises when two or more objects are perceived and suggest
various relations of likeness and so forth.[493] This provides a
scheme for working out the whole doctrine of the sequences of ideas so
far as the sequences depend upon the mind itself and not upon external
causes. It thus leads to problems of abstraction and generalisation
and to his whole theory of what he calls the 'intellectual states.' He
again closely coincides with the French ideologists. He starts by
examining Locke and Condillac. He of course professes to hold that
Condillac's version of Locke is illegitimate, and ridicules the famous
formula _penser c'est sentir_. He is, however, equally unwilling to
admit Reid's 'variety of powers.'[494] In fact, his criticism of
Condillac shows more affinity than contrast. Condillac erred, he says,
in holding that thoughts are 'transformed sensations.' This was a
false simplification into which he considers Condillac to have been
led partly by the ambiguity of the word _sentir_.[495] Condillac
applied to the mind the theory, true in 'the chemistry of the material
chemists,' that the 'compounds are the elements themselves.'[496] He
errs when