ns about Man which can only be verbal.

For instance: let MAN be that concerning which you would by these first
principles demonstrate anything, and we shall see, that so far as
demonstration is by these principles, it is only verbal, and gives us
no certain, universal, true proposition, or knowledge, of any being
existing without us. First, a child having framed the idea of a man, it
is probable that his idea is just like that picture which the
painter makes of the visible appearances joined together; and such a
complication of ideas together in his understanding makes up the single
complex idea which he calls man, whereof white or flesh-colour in
England being one, the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not
a man, because white colour was one of the constant simple ideas of the
complex idea he calls man; and therefore he can demonstrate, by the
principle, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE, that
a negro is NOT a man; the foundation of his certainty being not that
universal proposition, which perhaps he never heard nor thought of, but
the clear, distinct perception he hath of his own simple ideas of black
and white, which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever mistake
one for another, whether he knows that maxim or no. And to this child,
or any one who hath such an idea, which he calls man, can you never
demonstrate that a man hath a soul, because his idea of man includes no
such notion or idea in it. And therefore, to him, the principle of WHAT
IS, IS, proves not this matter; but it depends upon collection and
observation, by which he is to make his complex idea called man.

17. Another instance.

Secondly, Another that hath gone further in framing and collecting the
idea he calls MAN, and to the outward shape adds laughter and rational
discourse, may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men, by
this maxim, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO BE; and
I have discoursed with very rational men, who have actually denied that
they are men.

18. A third instance.

Thirdly, Perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls MAN,
only out of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language and
reason, and leaves out the shape wholly: this man is able to demonstrate
that a man may have no hands, but be QUADRUPES, neither of those being
included in his idea of man: and in whatever body or shape he found
speech and reason joined, that was a m