d we should take it amiss if others should
prescribe to us what points we should study. And if he be one who takes
his opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should renounce
those tenets which time and custom have so settled in his mind, that he
thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionably certainty; or which
he takes to be impressions he has received from God himself, or from men
sent by him? How can we expect, I say, that opinions thus settled should
be given up to the arguments or authority of a stranger or adversary,
especially if there be any suspicion of interest or design, as there
never fails to be, where men find themselves ill-trusted? We should do
well to commiserate our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in
all the gentle and fair ways of information; and not instantly treat
others ill, as obstinate and perverse, because they will not renounce
their own, and receive our opinions, or at least those we would force
upon them, when it is more than probable that we are no less obstinate
in not embracing some of theirs. For where is the man that has
incontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of the
falsehood of all he condemns; or can say that he has examined to the
bottom all his own, or other men's opinions? The necessity of believing
without knowledge, nay often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting
state of action and blindness we are in, should make us more busy and
careful to inform ourselves than constrain others. At least, those who
have not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets, must
confess they are unfit to prescribe to others; and are unreasonable in
imposing that as truth on other men's belief, which they themselves have
not searched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability, on which
they should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly
examined, and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they
profess and govern themselves by, would have a juster pretence to
require others to follow them: but these are so few in number, and find
so little reason to be magisterial in their opinions, that nothing
insolent and imperious is to be expected from them: and there is reason
to think, that, if men were better instructed themselves, they would be
less imposing on others.
5. Probability is either of sensible Matter of Fact, capable of human
testimony, or of what is beyond the evidence of our senses.
But to return to t
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