idence, first, that we deceive not
ourselves, in ascribing it to God; secondly, that we understand it
right; can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive
knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in
two places at once. And therefore NO PROPOSITION CAN BE RECEIVED FOR
DIVINE REVELATION, OR OBTAIN THE ASSENT DUE TO ALL SUCH, IF IT BE
CONTRADICTORY TO OUR CLEAR INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. Because this would be to
subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and
assent whatsoever: and there would be left no difference between truth
and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if
doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what
we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In
propositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the agreement
or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as
matters of faith. They cannot move our assent under that or any other
title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of anything that
contradicts our knowledge. Because, though faith be founded on the
testimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us:
yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine
revelation greater than our own knowledge. Since the whole strength of
the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which,
in this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our
knowledge or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, viz.
that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful
Author of our being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the
principles and foundations of knowledge he has given us; render all
our faculties useless; wholly destroy the most excellent part of his
workmanship, our understandings; and put a man in a condition wherein he
will have less light, less conduct than the beast that perisheth. For
if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear)
evidence of anything to be a divine revelation, as it has of the
principles of its own reason, it can never have a ground to quit the
clear evidence of its reason, to give a place to a proposition, whose
revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have.
6. Traditional Revelation much less.
Thus far a man has use of reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in
immediate and origi
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