may, I
think, in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all
the religions which possess and divide mankind. For men having been
principled with an opinion, that they must not consult reason in the
things of religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense and
the very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies
and natural superstition; and have been by them led into so strange
opinions, and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man
cannot but stand amazed, at their follies, and judge them so far from
being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid
thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that,
in effect, religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts,
and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above
brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational, and more
senseless than beasts themselves. CREDO, QUIA IMPOSSIBILE EST: I
believe, because it is impossible, might, in a good man, pass for a
sally of zeal; but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their
opinions or religion by.

CHAPTER XIX. [not in early editions]

CHAPTER XX.

OF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERROR.

1. Causes of Error, or how men come to give assent contrary to
probability.

KNOWLEDGE being to be had only of visible and certain truth, ERROR is
not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment giving
assent to that which is not true.

But if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive
of our assent be probability, and that probability consists in what is
laid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded HOW MEN COME TO
GIVE THEIR ASSENTS CONTRARY TO PROBABILITY. For there is nothing more
common than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious than that
one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third
steadfastly believes and firmly adheres to.

The reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet, I suppose may
all be reduced to these four:

I. WANT OF PROOFS.

II. WANT OF ABILITY TO USE THEM.

III. WANT OF WILL TO SEE THEM.

IV. WRONG MEASURES OF PROBABILITY.

2. First cause of Error, Want of Proofs.

FIRST, By WANT OF PROOFS, I do not mean only the want of those proofs
which are nowhere extant, and so are nowhere to be had; but the want
even of those proofs which are in being, or might be procured. And thus
men want proof