zed it, that it would be folly either to oppose
or hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice,
that, however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm
assent of the mind: which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be
afforded to anything but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite to
it. He that believes without having any reason for believing, may be in
love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays
the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning
faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He
that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights
on truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether
the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his
proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for
whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the light
and faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth
by those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing
his duty as a rational creature, that, though he should miss truth, he
will not miss the reward of it. For he governs his assent right, and
places it as he should, who, in any case or matter whatsoever, believes
or disbelieves according as reason directs him. He that doth otherwise,
transgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties which
were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer
evidence and greater probability. But since reason and faith are by some
men opposed, we will so consider them in the following chapter.
CHAPTER XVIII.
OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES.
1. Necessary to know their boundaries.
It has been above shown, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and want
knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas. 2. That we are ignorant,
and want rational knowledge, where we want proofs. 3. That we want
certain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined
specific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our assent in
matters where we have neither knowledge of our own nor testimony of
other men to bottom our reason upon. From these things thus premised, I
think we may come to lay down THE MEASURES AND BOUNDARIES BETWEEN FAITH
AND REASON: the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not of
great disorders, yet at least of great di
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