nds, and of the beginning of motion, or thought how
the mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet of the
operation of God, run into great difficulties about FREE CREATED AGENTS,
which reason cannot well extricate itself out of.
11. III. Thirdly, Because we perceive not intermediate Ideas to show
conclusions.
Our reason is often at a stand, because it perceives not those ideas,
which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or
disagreement of any other two ideas: and in this some men's faculties
far outgo others. Till algebra, that great instrument and instance of
human sagacity, was discovered, men with amazement looked on several of
the demonstrations of ancient mathematicians, and could scarce forbear
to think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than
human.
12. IV. Fourthly, Because we often proceed upon wrong Principles.
The mind, by proceeding upon false principles, is often engaged in
absurdities and difficulties, brought into straits and contradictions,
without knowing how to free itself: and in that case it is in vain to
implore the help of reason, unless it be to discover the falsehood and
reject the influence of those wrong principles. Reason is so far from
clearing the difficulties which the building upon false foundations
brings a man into, that if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more,
and engages him deeper in perplexities.
13. V. Fifthly, Because we often employ doubtful Terms.
As obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our reason, so, upon the
same ground, do dubious words and uncertain signs, often, in discourses
and arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle men's reason, and
bring them to a nonplus. But these two latter are our fault, and not
the fault of reason. But yet the consequences of them are nevertheless
obvious; and the perplexities or errors they fill men's minds with are
everywhere observable.
14. Our highest Degree of Knowledge is intuitive, without Reasoning.
Some of the ideas that are in the mind, are so there, that they can be
by themselves immediately compared one with another: and in these the
mind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as that
it has them. Thus the mind perceives, that an arch of a circle is less
than the whole circle, as clearly as it does the idea of a circle: and
this, therefore, as has been said, I call INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE; which is
certain, beyond all dou
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