like
propositions we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear,
in this state capable of knowing. We are not, then, to put others upon
demonstrating, nor ourselves upon search of universal certainty in all
those matters; wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge, but
what our senses give us in this or that particular.

13. Only particular Propositions concerning concrete Existances are
knowable.

By which it appears that there are two sorts of propositions:--(1)
There is one sort of propositions concerning the existence of anything
answerable to such an idea: as having the idea of an elephant, phoenix,
motion, or an angel, in my mind, the first and natural inquiry is,
Whether such a thing does anywhere exist? And this knowledge is only of
particulars. No existence of anything without us, but only of God, can
certainly be known further than our senses inform us, (2) There is
another sort of propositions, wherein is expressed the agreement or
disagreement of OUR ABSTRACT IDEAS, and their dependence on one another.
Such propositions may be universal and certain. So, having the idea of
God and myself, of fear and obedience, I cannot but be sure that God is
to be feared and obeyed by me: and this proposition will be certain,
concerning man in general, if I have made an abstract idea of such a
species, whereof I am one particular. But yet this proposition, how
certain soever, that 'men ought to fear and obey God' proves not to
me the EXISTENCE of MEN in the world; but will be true of all such
creatures, whenever they do exist: which certainty of such general
propositions depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discovered
in those abstract ideas.

14. And all general Propositions that are know to be true concern
abstract Ideas.

In the former case, our knowledge is the consequence of the existence
of things, producing ideas in our minds by our senses: in the latter,
knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what they will) that
are in our minds, producing there general certain propositions. Many of
these are called AETERNAE VERITATES, and all of them indeed are so; not
from being written, all or any of them, in the minds of all men; or that
they were any of them propositions in any one's mind, till he, having
got the abstract ideas, joined or separated them by affirmation or
negation. But wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is,
endowed with such faculties, and thereb