FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   227   228   229   230   231   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239   240   241   242   243   244   245   246   247   248   249   250   251  
252   253   254   255   256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265   266   267   268   269   270   271   272   273   274   275   276   >>   >|  
y furnished with such ideas as we have, we must conclude, he must needs, when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propositions that will arise from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas. Such propositions are therefore called ETERNAL TRUTHS, not because they are eternal propositions actually formed, and antecedent to the understanding that at any time makes them; nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that are anywhere out of the mind, and existed before: but because, being once made about abstract ideas, so as to be true, they will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time, past or come, by a mind having those ideas, always actually be true. For names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas, and the same ideas having immutably the same habitudes one to another, propositions concerning any abstract ideas that are once true must needs be ETERNAL VERITIES. CHAPTER XII. OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE 1. Knowledge is not got from Maxims. IT having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters, that MAXIMS were the foundation of all knowledge; and that the sciences were each of them built upon certain PRAECOGNITA, from whence the understanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conduct itself in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that science, the beaten road of the Schools has been, to lay down in the beginning one or more GENERAL PROPOSITIONS, as foundations whereon to build the knowledge that was to be had of that subject. These doctrines, thus laid down for foundations of any science, were called PRINCIPLES, as the beginnings from which we must set out, and look no further backwards in our inquiries, as we have already observed. 2. (The Occasion of that Opinion.) One thing which might probably give an occasion to this way of proceeding in other sciences, was (as I suppose) the good success it seemed to have in MATHEMATICS, wherein men, being observed to attain a great certainty of knowledge, these sciences came by pre-eminence to be called [word in Greek], and [word in Greek], learning, or things learned, thoroughly learned, as having of all others the greatest certainty, clearness, and evidence in them. 3. But from comparing clear and distinct Ideas. But if any one will consider, he will (I guess) find, that the great advancem
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   227   228   229   230   231   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239   240   241   242   243   244   245   246   247   248   249   250   251  
252   253   254   255   256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265   266   267   268   269   270   271   272   273   274   275   276   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
propositions
 

called

 

sciences

 

knowledge

 

science

 

abstract

 

observed

 

foundations

 

inquiries

 
supposed

certainty

 

ETERNAL

 

learned

 

understanding

 

subject

 

comparing

 

doctrines

 
beginnings
 
whereon
 
PRINCIPLES

PROPOSITIONS

 

Schools

 

advancem

 

beaten

 

distinct

 

GENERAL

 

beginning

 

learning

 
suppose
 

proceeding


things
 
success
 

attain

 
MATHEMATICS
 
eminence
 
occasion
 

Occasion

 

Opinion

 
evidence
 
clearness

greatest
 

backwards

 

Maxims

 
patterns
 
existed
 

imprinted

 

formed

 

antecedent

 

eternal

 

TRUTHS