ies,
as a truth they have discovered; and for the future they remain
satisfied with the testimony of their memories, that this is the opinion
that, by the proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of
their assent as they afford it.

2. These can not always be actually in View; and then we must content
ourselves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a Degree
of Assent.

This is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing, in
regulating their opinions and judgments; unless a man will exact of
them, either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofs
concerning any probable truth, and that too, in the same order, and
regular deduction of consequences in which they have formerly placed
or seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume on one
single question: or else they must require a man, for every opinion that
he embraces, every day to examine the proofs: both which are impossible.
It is unavoidable, therefore, that the memory be relied on in the case,
and that men be persuaded of several opinions, whereof the proofs are
not actually in their thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not able
actually to recall. Without this, the greatest part of men must be
either very sceptics; or change every moment, and yield themselves up
to whoever, having lately studied the question, offers them arguments,
which, for want of memory, they are not able presently to answer.

3. The ill consequence of this, if our former Judgments were not rightly
made.

I cannot but own, that men's sticking to their past judgment, and
adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of
great obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is not that they
rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but
because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a
great number (not to say the greatest part) of men that think they have
formed right judgments of several matters; and that for no other reason,
but because they never thought otherwise? that themselves to have judged
right, only because they never questioned, never examined, their own
opinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never
judged at all. And yet these, of all men, hold their opinions with the
greatest stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in
their tenets, who have least examined them. What we once KNOW, we are
certain is so: and we