on. The existence of a
God, reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shown.
The knowledge of the existence of ANY OTHER THING we can have only by
SENSATION: for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with
any IDEA a man hath in his memory; nor of any other existence but that
of God with the existence of any particular man: no particular man
can know the existence of any other being, but only when, by actual
operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him. For, the having
the idea of anything in our mind, no more proves the existence of that
thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or
the visions of a dream make thereby a true history.
2. Instance: Whiteness of this Paper.
It is therefore the ACTUAL RECEIVING of ideas from without that gives
us notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know, that
something doth exist at that time without us, which causes that idea in
us; though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it. For it
takes not from the certainty of our senses, and the ideas we receive by
them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced: v.g. whilst
I write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced
in my mind, which, whatever object causes, I call WHITE; by which I know
that that quality or accident (i.e. whose appearance before my eyes
always causes that idea) doth really exist, and hath a being without me.
And of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my
faculties can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper
and sole judges of this thing; whose testimony I have reason to rely on
as so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I
see white and black, and that something really exists that causes that
sensation in me, than that I write or move my hand; which is a certainty
as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence of
anything, but a man's self alone, and of God.
3. This notice by our Senses, though not so certain as Demonstration,
yet may be called Knowledge, and proves the Existence of Things without
us.
The notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us,
though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or
the deductions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas
of our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of
KNOWLEDGE. If we persuade ourselves th
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