ent
testimony of our senses, employed about particular objects that do then
affect them, and no further. For if I saw such a collection of simple
ideas as is wont to be called MAN, existing together one minute since,
and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now,
since there is no NECESSARY CONNEXION of his existence a minute since
with his existence now: by a thousand ways he may cease to be, since I
had the testimony of my senses for his existence. And if I cannot be
certain that the man I saw last to-day is now in being, I can less be
certain that he is so who hath been longer removed from my senses, and I
have not seen since yesterday, or since the last year: and much less can
I be certain of the existence of men that I never saw. And, therefore,
though it be highly probable that millions of men do now exist, yet,
whilst I am alone, writing this, I have not that certainty of it which
we strictly call knowledge; though the great likelihood of it puts me
past doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the
confidence that there are men (and men also of my acquaintance, with
whom I have to do) now in the world: but this is but probability, not
knowledge.
10. Folly to expect Demonstration in everything.
Whereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a thing it is for a
man of a narrow knowledge, who having reason given him to judge of
the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed
accordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and
certainty in things not capable of it; and refuse assent to very
rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths,
because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the
least (I will not say reason, but) pretence of doubting. He that, in
the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain
demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing
quickly. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him
reason to venture on it: and I would fain know what it is he could do
upon such grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection.
11. Past Existence of other things is known by Memory.
As WHEN OUR SENSES ARE ACTUALLY EMPLOYED ABOUT ANY OBJECT, we do know
that it does exist; so BY OUR MEMORY we may be assured, that heretofore
things that affected our senses have existed. And thus we have knowledge
of the past existence of several things,
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