an; because, having a clear
knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that WHAT IS, IS.
19. Little use of these Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and
distinct Ideas.
So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, That where our ideas
are determined in our minds, and have annexed to them by us known and
steady names under those settled determinations, there is little need,
or no use at all of these maxims, to prove the agreement or disagreement
of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such
propositions, without the help of these and the like maxims, will not be
helped by these maxims to do it: since he cannot be supposed to know the
truth of these maxims themselves without proof, if he cannot know the
truth of others without proof, which are as self-evident as these. Upon
this ground it is that intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits
any proof, one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it
does, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty; and he
that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his assent to this
proposition, that two are equal to two, will also have need of a proof
to make him admit, that what is, is. He that needs a probation to
convince him that two are not three, that white is not black, that a
triangle is not a circle, &c., or any other two [determined] distinct
ideas are not one and the same, will need also a demonstration to
convince him that IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING TO BE AND NOT TO
BE.
20. Their Use dangerous where our Ideas are not determined
And as these maxims are of little use where we have determined ideas, so
they are, as I have showed, of dangerous use where [our ideas are not
determined; and where] we use words that are not annexed to determined
ideas, but such as are of a loose and wandering signification, sometimes
standing for one, and sometimes for another idea: from which follow
mistake and error, which these maxims (brought as proofs to establish
propositions, wherein the terms stand for undetermined ideas) do by
their authority confirm and rivet.
CHAPTER VIII. OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.
1. Some Propositions bring no Increase to our Knowledge.
WHETHER the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter be of that use to
real knowledge as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered.
This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, That there ARE universal
propositions, which, thou
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