gh they be certainly true, yet they add no
light to our understanding; bring no increase to our knowledge. Such
are--

2. As, First, identical Propositions.

First, All purely IDENTICAL PROPOSITIONS. These obviously and at first
blush appear to contain no instruction in them; for when we affirm the
said term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains
any clear and real idea, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly
know before, whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed
to us. Indeed, that most general one, WHAT IS, IS, may serve sometimes
to show a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when, by circumlocution or
equivocal terms, he would in particular instances deny the same thing of
itself; because nobody will so openly bid defiance to common sense, as
to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words; or, if he
does, a man is excused if he breaks off any further discourse with him.
But yet I think I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor any
other identical proposition, teaches us anything; and though in such
kind of propositions this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be the
foundation of demonstration, may be and often is made use of to confirm
them, yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, That the same word
may with great certainty be affirmed of itself, without any doubt of the
truth of any such proposition; and let me add, also, without any real
knowledge.

3. Examples.

For, at this rate, any very ignorant person, who can but make a
proposition, and knows what he means when he says ay or no, may make a
million of propositions of whose truth he may be infallibly certain, and
yet not know one thing in the world thereby; v.g. 'what is a soul, is a
soul;' or, 'a soul is a soul;' 'a spirit is a spirit;' 'a fetiche is a
fetiche,' &c. These all being equivalent to this proposition, viz. WHAT
IS, IS; i.e. what hath existence, hath existence; or, who hath a soul,
hath a soul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but like
a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other: and had he but
words, might no doubt have said, 'Oyster in right hand is subject, and
oyster in left hand is predicate:' and so might have made a self-evident
proposition of oyster, i.e. oyster is oyster; and yet, with all this,
not have been one whit the wiser or more knowing: and that way of
handling the matter would much at one have satisfied the monkey's
hu