forests,
where artillery and cavalry could play no part; where the troops could
not be seen by those controlling their movements; where the echoes and
reverberations of sound from tree to tree were enough to appall the
strongest hearts engaged, and yet the noise would often be scarcely
heard beyond the immediate scene of strife. Thus the generals on
either side, shut out from sight and from hearing, had to trust to the
unyielding bravery of their men till couriers from the different parts
of the field, often extending for miles, brought word which way the
conflict was resulting, before sending the needed support. We should not
wonder that such battles often terminated from the mutual exhaustion
of both contending forces, but rather, that, in all these struggles of
Americans against Americans, no panic on either side gave victory to the
other, like that which the French under Moreau gained over the Austrians
in the Black Forest." (Warren.)

The Confederates had their general plan of action, viz., to drive their
opponents from the Chancellor House, in order to re-unite their
right and left wings, and to obtain possession of the direct road to
Fredericksburg, where lay Early and Barksdale. To accomplish this
end, they attacked the centre of Hooker's army,--the right centre
particularly,--which blocked their way towards both objects.

It had been no difficult task to divine their purpose. Indeed, it is
abundantly shown that Hooker understood it, in his testimony already
quoted. But, if he needed evidence of the enemy's plans, he had acquired
full knowledge, shortly after dawn, that the bulk of Stuart's corps
was still confronting Sickles and Williams, where they had fought the
evening before; and that Anderson and McLaws had not materially changed
their position in front of Geary and Hancock. He could have ascertained,
by an early morning reconnoissance, (indeed, his corps-commanders did
so on their own responsibility,) that there was no enemy whatsoever
confronting his right and left flanks, where three corps, the First,
Fifth, and Eleventh, lay chafing with eagerness to engage the foe. And
the obvious thing to do was to leave a curtain of troops to hold these
flanks, which were protected by almost insuperable natural obstacles, as
well as formidable intrenchments, and hold the superfluous troops well
in hand, as a central reserve, in the vicinity of headquarters, to be
launched against the attacking columns of the enemy