ion had not so much more been
required of him. But, remembering that time was of the essence of his
orders, it may be as well to quote the criticism of Warren--

"It takes some men just as long to clear away a little force as it does
a large one. It depends entirely upon the man, how long a certain force
will stop him."

"The enemy had left about one division, perhaps ten thousand or twelve
thousand men, at Fredericksburg, to watch him. They established a kind
of picket-line around his division, so that he could not move any thing
without their knowing it. Just as soon as Gen. Sedgwick began to move,
a little random fire began, and that was kept up till daylight.
At daylight, the head of Gen. Sedgwick's troops had got into
Fredericksburg. I think some little attempt had been made to move
forward a skirmish-line, but that had been repulsed. The enemy had
considerable artillery in position."

"My opinion was, that, under the circumstances, the most vigorous effort
possible ought to have been made, without regard to circumstances,
because the order was peremptory." But this statement is qualified,
when, in his examination before the Committee on the Conduct of the War,
to a question as to whether, in his opinion, Gen. Sedgwick's vigorous
and energetic attempt to comply with Hooker's order would have led to a
different result of the battle, Warren answered: "Yes, sir! and I will
go further, and say that I think there might have been more fighting
done at the other end of the line. I do not believe that if Gen.
Sedgwick had done all he could, and there had not been harder fighting
on the other end of the line, we would have succeeded."

If, at eleven P.M., when Sedgwick received the order, he had immediately
marched, regardless of what was in his front, straight through the town,
and up the heights beyond, paying no heed whatever to the darkness of
the night, but pushing on his men as best he might, it is not improbable
that he could have gained the farther side of this obstacle by
daylight. But is it not also probable that his corps would have been
in questionable condition for either a march or a fight? It would
be extravagant to expect that the organization of the corps could be
preserved in any kind of form, however slight the opposition. And, as
daylight came on, the troops would have scarcely been in condition to
offer brilliant resistance to the attack, which Early, fully apprised
of all their movements, would hav