arly advanced from his position at Cox's,
and with very little difficulty recaptured the heights, held by only
a few of Gibbon's men. Barksdale was again posted in the trenches, and
instructed to keep Gibbon in check. Early meanwhile moved out to join
McLaws, feeling our position with Smith's brigade, and ascertaining the
left of our line to lie near Taylor's, and to extend from there down to
the plank road.

At an early hour on Monday morning, it came to Sedgwick's knowledge,
that the Confederates had re-occupied the heights in his rear, and cut
him off from Fredericksburg, thus leaving him only Banks's Ford as a
possible outlet in case of disaster. An attempt was made by Early to
throw a force about Howe's left, and seize the approaches to the ford;
but it was timely met, and repulsed by our men, who captured in this
affair two hundred prisoners and a battle-flag. And, to forestall any
serious movement to cut him off from Banks's Ford, Sedgwick had already
formed Howe's division in line to the rear, extending, as we have seen,
from the river to the plank road.

In his report, and particularly in his testimony before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War, Howe speaks as if he had received from
Sedgwick only general--in fact, vague--and rare instructions, as to the
dispositions to be made of his division; and that all his particular
manoeuvres were originated and completed on his own responsibility, upon
information, or mere hints, from headquarters of the corps. His line,
over two miles long, was covered by less than six thousand men.

The despatch from Warren reached Sedgwick while matters were in this
condition. To retire to Fredericksburg was impossible; to retire across
Banks's Ford, except by night, equally so, unless he chose to hazard a
disastrous attack from the superior force in his front. For Sedgwick had
scarce twenty thousand men left to confront Lee's twenty-five thousand,
and imagined the odds to be far greater. Our line was formed with the
left on the river, midway between Fredericksburg and Banks's Ford,
running southerly to beyond the plank road, following this on the south
side for nearly two miles, and then turning north to the crest which
Wheaton had held the night before. This was a long, weak position,
depending upon no natural obstacles; but it was, under the
circumstances, well defended by a skilful disposition of the artillery,
under charge of Col. Tompkins. Gen. Newton's division held the