s spread the
facts so fully before the reading public. No part of my recent criticism
before the Lowell Institute was new. It was embodied at much greater
length four years ago, in my "History of Chancellorsville;" the
reception of which volume by press, public, and soldiers, has been its
own best excuse. Gen. Hooker, though making no report, has put on record
his explanation of this campaign. Before the Committee on the Conduct of
the War, he stated his views as follows: "I may say here, the battle of
Chancellorsville has been associated with the battle of Fredericksburg,
and has been called a disaster. My whole loss in the battle of
Chancellorsville was a little over seventeen thousand.... In my opinion,
there is nothing to regret in regard to Chancellorsville, except to
accomplish all I moved to accomplish. The troops lost no honor, except
one corps, and we lost no more men than the enemy; but expectation was
high, the army in splendid condition, and greater results were expected
from it. When I returned from Chancellorsville, I felt that I had fought
no battle; in fact, I had more men than I could use, and I fought no
general battle, for the reason that I could not get my men in position
to do so."
To speak thus of a passage of arms lasting a week and costing seventeen
thousand men is, to say the least, abnormal.
In trying to shift the onus of failure from his own shoulders he said:
"Some of our corps commanders, and also officers of other rank, appear
to be unwilling to go into a fight.... So far as my experience extends,
there are in all armies officers more valiant after the fight than while
it is pending, and when a truthful history of the Rebellion shall
be written, it will be found that the Army of the Potomac is not an
exception."
This slur is cast upon men like Reynolds, Meade, Couch, Sedgwick,
Slocum, Howard, Hancock, Humphreys, Sykes, Warren, Birney, Whipple,
Wright, Griffin, and many others equally gallant. To call it ungenerous,
is a mild phrase. It certainly does open the door to unsparing
criticism. Hooker also concisely stated his military rule of action:
"Throughout the Rebellion I have acted on the principle that if I had as
large a force as the enemy, I had no apprehensions of the result of
an encounter." And in his initial orders to Stoneman, in opening the
campaign, came the true ring of the always gallant corps commander, "Let
your watchword be 'Fight!' and let all your orders be, 'Fight,
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