constantly at his side. "Gen. Sedgwick was ordered to
be in his position by daylight: of course that implied, if he could be
there."
"If Sedgwick had got to Chancellorsville by daylight, I think we ought
to have destroyed Lee's army. But it would depend a great deal upon
how hard the other part of the army fought; for Gen. Sedgwick, with his
twenty thousand men, was in great danger of being destroyed if he became
isolated."
Moreover, Hooker in this testimony says: "Early in the campaign I
had come to the conclusion that with the arms now in use it would be
impossible to carry works by an assault in front, provided they
were properly constructed and properly manned;" and refers to the
Fredericksburg assault of Dec. 13, to illustrate this position, saying
that they (the enemy) "could destroy men faster than I could throw
them on the works;" and, "I do not know of an instance when rifle-pits,
properly constructed and properly manned, have been taken by front
assaults alone."
And yet his order to Sedgwick was (as he construes it), blindly to
throw himself into this impossible situation, and lose every man in his
command rather than not make the attempt at once, and without waiting
properly to dispose his men, or feel the enemy.
As to the leisurely marching of two or three miles on Sunday, we have
seen how Brooks's march was summarily arrested at Salem Church, and how
his attempt to force a passage, cost him alone some fifteen hundred men.
There is a good deal of evidence difficult to deal with in this movement
of the Sixth Corps. The report of Gen. Howe, written immediately after
the campaign, states facts dispassionately, and is to the point and
nothing more. This is as it should be in the report of a general to his
superior. It has but one error of consequence, viz., the assumption that
the three divisions of Anderson, McLaws, and Early, all under command
of Gen. Lee, attacked his line, leaving no force in front of Brooks and
Newton. It was Early alone, or Early assisted by a brigade of Anderson,
who attacked Howe.
But his testimony a year later, before the Committee on the Conduct
of the War, cannot be commended as dispassionate, and contains
serious errors. Gen. Howe states that the order to advance towards
Chancellorsville was received "just after dark, say eight o'clock,"
whereas it was not sent until nine P.M. from Chancellorsville, and ten
P.M. from Falmouth; nor did Sedgwick receive it until eleven P.
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