d despatch of his superior advised him
to do so. But Hooker states that "my desire was to have Gen. Sedgwick
retain a position on the south side of the river, in order that I might
leave a sufficient force to hold the position I was in, and with the
balance of my force re-cross the river, march down to Banks's Ford, and
turn the enemy's position in my front by so doing. In this, too, I was
thwarted, because the messenger who bore the despatch to Sedgwick to
withdraw and cover Banks's Ford, reached Sedgwick before the one who
bore the order countermanding the withdrawal."

Hooker had indicated to Sedgwick that he wished him to take and hold
a position at Taylor's, the point where the Fredericksburg heights
approach the river, above the town, and terminate. But as these heights
were by that time held by Early, and there were no pontoon-bridges
there, the proposal was one Sedgwick knew could not be seriously
entertained, with two-thirds of Lee's whole army surrounding his one
corps, though he did reconnoitre the ground in a vain effort to carry
out his chief's suggestions.

But was it not simpler for Hooker, who had now only Jackson's corps in
his front,--some eighteen thousand men to eighty thousand,--to move upon
his enemy, "attack and destroy him," and himself fall upon Lee's rear,
while Sedgwick kept him occupied at Banks's Ford? And Hooker had all
Sunday afternoon and night, and all day Monday, to ponder and arrange
for attempting this simplest of manoeuvres.

It is hard to understand how the man, who could cut out such a gigantic
piece of work for his lieutenant, as Hooker did for Sedgwick, could
lack the enterprise to execute so trivial a tactical movement as the one
indicated. From the stirring words, "Let your watchword be Fight, and
let all your orders be Fight, Fight, FIGHT!" of April 12, to the inertia
and daze of the 4th of May, is indeed a bewildering step. And yet
Hooker, to judge from his testimony, seems to have fully satisfied
himself that he did all that was to be expected of an active and
intelligent commander.

The impression that an attack should have been made, prevailed among
many of his subordinates. Gen. Wadsworth thus testified before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War: "Question.--Can you tell why it was
not ordered to attack the enemy at the time Gen. Sickles with his Third
Corps was driven back; or why it was not ordered to attack the next day,
when you heard the sound of Gen. Sedgwic