trained to the
profession of arms; though all allowed his right to a valid judgment.
But he claimed, with some reason, that the political horizon was dark;
that success by the Army of the Potomac was secondary to the avoidance
of disaster. If, he alleged, this army should be destroyed, it would be
the last one the country would raise. Washington might be captured; and
the effect of this loss upon the country, and upon Europe, was to be
greatly dreaded. The enemies of the administration were strong, and
daily gaining ground. It was necessary that the Army of the Potomac
should not run the risk of destruction. It was the last hold of the
Republican party in Virginia. Better re-cross and recuperate, and then
attempt another campaign, than run any serious risk now. These
grounds largely influenced him in agreeing with the general-in-chief's
determination to retire across the river. But there were other reasons,
which Sickles states in his testimony. The rations with which the men
had started had given out, and there had been no considerable issue
since. Singularly enough, too, (for Hooker was, as a rule, unusually
careful in such matters,) there had been no provision made for supplying
the troops against a possible advance; and yet, from Sunday noon
till Tuesday night, we had lain still behind our intrenchments, with
communications open, and with all facilities at hand to prepare for a
ten-days' absence from our base. This circumstance wears the look of
almost a predetermination to accept defeat.

Now, at the last moment, difficulties began to arise in bringing over
supplies. The river had rapidly risen from the effects of the storm.
Parts of the bridges had been carried away by the torrent. The ends of
the others were under water, and their entire structure was liable at
any moment to give way. It was not certain that Lee, fully aware of
these circumstances, would, for the moment, accept battle, as he
might judge it better to lure the Army of the Potomac away from the
possibility of victualling. Perhaps Sedgwick would be unable to cross
again so as to join the right wing. The Eleventh Corps might not be in
condition to count on for heavy service. The Richmond papers, received
almost daily through channels more or less irregular, showed that
communications were still open, and that the operations of the Cavalry
Corps had not succeeded in interrupting them in any serious manner. On
the coming Sunday, the time of service of t