erest, in this connection, as showing how
keen Mr. Lincoln's intuitions occasionally were.
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, D.C., April 15, 1863.
MAJOR-GEN. HOOKER.
It is now 10.15 P.M. An hour ago I received your letter of this morning,
and a few moments later your despatch of this evening. The latter gives
me considerable uneasiness. The rain and mud, of course, were to be
calculated upon. Gen. S. is not moving rapidly enough to make the
expedition come to anything. He has now been out three days, two of
which were unusually fair weather, and all three without hinderance from
the enemy, and yet he is not twenty-five miles from where he started. To
reach his point he still has sixty to go, another river (the Rapidan)
to cross; and will he be hindered by the enemy? By arithmetic, how many
days will it take him to do it? I do not know that any better can be
done, but I greatly fear it is another failure already. Write me often.
I am very anxious.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
On the 28th, Stoneman received the following additional orders:--
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
MORRISVILLE, VA., April 28, 1863.
Commanding Officer Cavalry Corps.
I am directed by the major-general commanding to inform you that the
instructions communicated for your government on the 12th instant, are
so far modified as to require you to cross the Rappahannock at such
points as you may determine between Kelly's and Rappahannock Fords, and
for a portion of your force to move in the direction of Raccoon Ford
and Louisa Court House, while the remainder is engaged carrying into
execution that part of your original instructions, which relates to the
enemy's forces and positions on the line of the Alexandria and Orange
Railroad, and the line itself; the operations of this column to be
considered as masking the column which is directed to move, by forced
marches, to strike and destroy the line of the Aquia and Richmond
Railroad.
You are further directed to determine on some point for the columns to
unite; and it is recommended that it be on the Pamunkey, or near that
line, as you will then be in position with your full force to cut off
the retreat of the enemy by his shortest line. In all other respects
your instructions, as before referred t
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