he army
on the right was directed to re-cross the river, and did so on the night
between the 5th and 6th of May."

Now, the Franklin's Crossing plan, or its equivalent, had been tried by
Burnside, in December, with a loss of twelve thousand men; and it had
been fully canvassed and condemned as impracticable, before beginning
the Chancellorsville manoeuvre. To resuscitate it can therefore serve no
purpose but as an idle excuse. And the argument of elbow-room, if made,
is the one Hooker should have used against withdrawing from the open
country he had reached, to the Wilderness, on Friday, May 1.

"Being resolved on re-crossing the river on the night between the 4th
and 5th, I called the corps commanders together, not as a council
of war, but to ascertain how they felt in regard to making what I
considered a desperate move against the enemy in our front." Be it
remembered that the "desperate move" was one of eighty thousand men,
with twenty thousand more (Sedgwick) close at hand as a reserve, against
at the outside forty-five thousand men, if Early should be ordered up
to re-enforce Lee. And Hooker knew the force of Lee, or had as good
authority for knowing it as he had for most of the facts he assumed, in
condemning Sedgwick. Moreover, from the statements of prisoners we had
taken, very nearly an exact estimate could be made of the then numbers
of the Army of Northern Virginia.

All the corps commanders were present at this conference, except Slocum,
who afterwards came in. All were in favor of an advance, except Sickles;
while Couch wavered, fearing that no advance could be made to advantage
under Hooker. Hancock, (testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of
the War,) says: "I understood from him" (Couch) "always that he was in
favor of fighting then." Hooker claims Couch to have been for retreat;
but the testimony of the generals present, as far as available, goes to
show the council to have been substantially as will now be narrated.

Hooker retired for a while, to allow free expression of opinion; and,
with one exception, all present manifested a desire for another attack,
in full force,--Howard, Meade, and Reynolds being especially urgent to
this purpose. The one dissentient voice was Sickles; and he expressed
himself, confessedly, more from a political than a strategic standpoint.
He allowed the military reasons to be sound for an advance, and modestly
refrained from putting his opinion against that of men